




Managing Teams and Keys with Keybase

Max Krohn (<https://keybase.io/max>)





etc.



qmail

cv

moinmoin

wiki

ircd

just scp it
from my
machine

18.26.4.239

- Federated management was better than what we have today but was never good enough.
- Managed apps in the cloud: maybe that ship has sailed
- **But at the very least, can we decentralize trust and key management?**



Basic Requirements

- Multi-device support
 - Get new phone for Christmas, enter username and password, and get instant access to all history
- Namable teams with mutable membership
- Authenticated invitation of new members

Threat Model

- Bad guys own any server infrastructure



Matthew Green

@matthew_d_green

Following



GCHQ has proposal to surveill encrypted messaging and phone calls. The idea is to use weaknesses in the “identity system” to create a surveillance backdoor. This is a bad idea for so many reasons. Thread. 1/



Principles for a More Informed Exceptional Access...

GCHQ officials outline how to enable the majority of the necessary lawful access without undermining the values we all hold dear.

lawfareblog.com

11:16 AM - 10 Dec 2018

808 Retweets 939 Likes



29



808



939



Security Goals

- PCS by default (this talk)
- Forward-secrecy is opt-in per-message and can be layered on top (outside scope)



Insufficient Solutions





Keybase's Approach

- Users think about “devices” not “keys”
- Each device in a user's cloud is equally powerful. Why?
 - We've all lost phones, laptops, slips of paper
 - The more devices, the less likely you are to lose your data
 - And you're most likely to discard your **oldest** device
- Reuse this abstraction for teams:
 - Devices are to Users as Users are to Teams



How Apps Work

- Every team has a random shared symmetric key that rotates when:
 - Users are removed from the team
 - Or any team member revokes a device
- All updates to the chat channel (or git repo or file system) are:
 - Encrypted for current shared team symmetric key
 - Signed by the user that made the update
 - To prevent Alice from putting words into Bob's mouth

Jump to chat

#github

#kbfs

#log-enthusiasts

#lunch

#monorepo

#nyc

#otr

#product-ideas

#random

#releases

#saltpack

#security

#spread-the-word

#stellar

#windows

keybase.bots

#alerts

#general

#github

keybasefriends

#general

keybasefriends.stellar_test...

#general

sdfkb.dev

#general

stellar.public

#general

stronghold.public

#general

max

keybase #random


akalin 1:31 PM

<https://thenextweb.com/dd/2019/01/05/github-now-gives-free-users-unlimited-private-repositories/>

The Next Web

GitHub now gives free users unlimited private repositories

Finally!



TNW


zanderz 1:41 PM

@mlsteele @chrisnojima @max The WWI/War of the Worlds mashup I mentioned: <https://vimeo.com/107454954>

Vimeo

Great martian war

Archive recreation taken from The Great Martian War documentary by impossible factual for History Canada. Directed by Mike Slee VFX/Animation Director : Christian...



2

1

7d

Write an exploding message **boom!**

bold, _italics_, `code`, >quote


Talk Outline

- How devices sign statements to constitute a user
- How users sign statements to constitute a team

How to Define a User

Account Creation

- Picks a new username n
- Rolls a new Ed25519 Signing Key Pair (s, S)
- Rolls a new Curve25519 DH Key Pair (d, D)
- Rolls a new “per-user-key” Curve25519 DH Key Pair (u, U)
- Signs D with s
- Encrypts u for D
- Crucially, s and d never leave the device; encryption of u does
- Posts 3 sigchain links to the Keybase Merkle Tree under n



Link 1:
Alice=S,
 $\sigma_s(\text{Alice}=S)$

Link 2:
 $\sigma_s(D, \text{Hash}(\text{link1}))$

Link 3:
 $\sigma_s(U, \text{Hash}(\text{link2}))$



New Device Addition

- New Ed25519 Key: (s', S')
- New Curve25519 Key: (d', D')
- Signs S with s' and S' with s
- Signs D' with s' as before
- Encrypts u for D'
- Posts 2 new sigchain links




Link 4:
 $\sigma_s(S', \sigma_{s'}(S), \text{Hash}(\textit{link3}))$

Link 5:
 $\sigma_{s'}(D', \text{Hash}(\textit{link4}))$



Revoking a Device

- Sign a statement to revoke S and D from lost/stolen/retired device
- Rotate per-user-key to (u', U') , and re-encrypts u' for all non-revoked devices



Link 6:
 $\sigma_s(\text{revoke}(S,D), \text{Hash}(\textit{link5}))$

Link 7:
 $\sigma_{s'}(U', \text{Hash}(\textit{link6}))$



rhine 2018-08

Last used Nov 21, 2018
2 months ago


Added Aug 17, 2018
by *iphone 8*

Revoke this device



Proving External Corroboration

- Alice posts a signature saying she is @theRealAlice on Twitter
- Then posts a hash of that signature to twitter



Link 8:
 $\sigma_s'(\text{twitter: @theRealAlice, Hash}(\textit{link7}))$

Review: Looking up Alice

- Descend the Merkle tree to Alice's leaf
- Fetch tail of her "sigchain"
- Playback chain from beginning to compute:
 - Signing Keys: $\{S'\}$
 - DH Keys: $\{D'\}$
 - Per-User-Key: U'
 - Claimed external identities: { twitter: @theRealAlice }


Keybase

People

4

Back

Search people



tammy

Tammy Camp

51 Followers · Following 13

Founder and CEO of Stronghold


San Francisco, CA


Following


Chat


...


Teams


 stronghold.public **OPEN**


 womenwhocrypto


 16J4vfpoZ5sKGA7BQr5ZirMqd5m
T1KeYf3@btc ✓


 tammycamp@twitter ✓


 tammyfcamp@facebook ✓


 tammycamp@github ✓

 hodl_strong@reddit ✓

 tammycamp@hackernews ✓


 E357 0FB4 2537 6D03@pgp ✓

 tammy*keybase.io
NEW


 public/tammy

FOLLOWERS (52)


FOLLOWING (13)




max
Max Krohn




aalpanigrahi
Aashish Loknath
Panigrahi




haenry




coreyballou
Corey Ballou



andreaborio
Andrea Borio



kungfooio
Matthew Clarke




sgehrman
Steve Gehrman

How to Define a Team

Creating a Team


- Alice creates the team “coinco” with two admins, her and Bob.
- Rolls a new team secret: t
 - From t , generates team public keys:
 - (s_t, S_t) for signing
 - (d_t, D_t) for Diffie-Hellman
 - And a symmetric key for encrypted shared team data
- Encrypts t for U_A and U_B



Link 1:
 $\sigma_A(\text{name}=\text{coinco},$
 $\text{admins}=\{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}, \text{keys}=\{S_t, D_t\})$


Adding a User to a Team

- Alice or Bob can now add Chuck to the team:
 - Admins can make membership changes
 - Non-admins just get to see team secrets
- Adds a sigchain link
- Encrypts t for U_C



Removing a User

- Admins can remove users, but must re-roll the team keys



Link 3:
 $\sigma_c(\text{remove}(\text{Alice}), \text{keys}=\{S'_t, D'_t\}, \text{Hash}(\text{link2}))$

Revoking a Device, Revisited

- Whenever team members revoke devices, their per-user-keys re-roll
- Therefore all teams they are in must re-roll their keys
- This can be done **lazily**, just before the next time someone chats, or writes a file for the team

Key Learning: PUKs

- v1.0 was built without
- Alice's mobile provisions a new laptop:
 - for all teams Alice is in:
 - Reencrypt team secret for laptop
- Rekey races Alice backgrounding the app
- Can resulting viral data loss across devices!

Details Elided /

Other Lessons Learned

- Root of Merkle Tree gets posted to Bitcoin blockchain periodically to prevent “forking attacks”
- Ephemeral Messaging easily Scaling up to a 2k user team
- Users **still** need “education” on key management

In Sum...

- Key problem: multi-device with instant access on new device
 - Solution: Per-user-keys
- Users are chains of device additions/removals
 - All devices are equally powerful
- Teams are chains of user additions/removals
 - All admins are equally powerful
- From there, build a shared secret key for teams that rotates on revocation or member removal.



